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returns. Microstructure measures of liquidity are shown to be important determi-
nants of the holding period decision of individual investors. Average holding periods
diﬀer across diﬀerent investor types. Turnover is an imperfect proxy for holding pe-
riod. While both turnover and spread are related to stock returns, holding period
is not.
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Introduction
Numerous empirical studies ﬁnd that liquidity matters for asset returns. On the theoreti-
cal side, however, there is little agreement on what aspects of liquidity can generate large
cross-sectional eﬀects in asset returns. A number of theoretical models use the concept
of expected holding period to link liquidity to asset prices.1 So far, it has been hard to
investigate these theories empirically. While some attempts have been made, they all
suﬀer from lack of data on actual holding periods. Instead they rely on proxies of investor
holding periods constructed from data on turnover. Even though a high-turnover stock
necessarily has many of the stock’s investors buying and selling the stock, it is by no
means certain that all owners of the stock have short holding periods.2 The core of this
problem is that turnover is a characteristic of a stock, while holding period is a decision
made by individual investors.
In the present paper, we analyze the relationship between holding periods, liquidity
and asset prices using data on actual holding periods. The source of our contribution is
access to the complete holdings for all investors at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over
a 10-year period.3 Our ability to measure holding periods from data on actual trading
decisions at the level of individual investors, observed over a substantial period of time,
1Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is an early model where the expected holding period enters.
2The stock may have a group of very long holding period owners, but high turnover among the
remaining investors.
3Current evidence on investor trading activity is largely based on small samples of investors, such as
the the single broker customers of Barber and Odean (2000).
2is quite exceptional. The only other papers which considers some of the same issues with
similar data are Kyrolainen and Perttunen (2006), using data from Finland, and Dias
and Ferreira (2005), using a sample of Portuguese investors. Both papers look at the
holding period decisions of individual investors using datasets which are of shorter time
periods, and, in the case of the Portuguese data, less complete, and neither of the papers
attempts to move beyond the behaviour of individual investors to the wider implications
of holding periods for the whole market.
In our work we look at three issues. First, we describe individual holding period
decisions, and evaluate the determinants of these decisions. The typical holding period
is found to be three quarters of a year, but the probabilities of liquidating an equity
position, conditional on the length of time the ownership has lasted, show considerable
time variation. Typical measures of liquidity, such as the bid/ask spread and turnover,
are important determinants of individual holding period decisions. We also ﬁnd clear
diﬀerences in average holding periods across investor types.
Second, we ask to what degree typical proxies of holding period measure actual holding
periods. We both compare actual holding period estimates to alternatives provided in the
literature, and investigate the extent to which, in the cross-section of equities, holding
periods and liquidity measures covary. Relative to existing evidence, holding periods
seem shorter than previously thought. This is due to the fact that the distribution of
actual holding periods is very skewed, at the same time as the distribution of turnover
across stocks is skewed. Our estimate of the median holding period from turnover data is
close to the mean actual holding period of around 2 years, a signiﬁcantly higher number
than the median actual holding period of 0.75 years. To investigate the consistency of
holding period and liquidity measures, we construct a measure of average holding period
at the stock level. As expected, the average holding period measure is positively related
to spreads and negatively related to turnover. However, the correlations are surprisingly
low.
Third, we investigate links between holding periods and asset prices. There are several
theoretical arguments linking these. In the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model there
is an indirect link, where long term investors choose high spread stocks, and Amihud and
Mendelson document a link between spreads and returns. Information based arguments,
such as those in Yan and Zhang (2008), imply returns diﬀerences if long and short term
investors are diﬀerently informed. To investigate these issues we therefore perform a
number of cross-sectional asset pricing tests involving measures of actual holding periods.
We ﬁnd that while the average holding period measure is related to other measures of
liquidity in the expected directions, it does a worse job in explaining the cross-section of
stock returns than more standard measures of liquidity.
3The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we brieﬂy summarize the papers
on holding periods, liquidity and asset pricing that are most relevant in our setting.
Section 2 describes the market and the data set. In Section 3 we investigate the individual
owners’ holding period decisions. In Section 4 we look at how our actual holding periods
compare to alternative proxies for holding periods suggested in the literature. We also
relate holding periods to standard measures of liquidity. In Section 5 we compare the
asset pricing implications of holding period measures and liquidity measures. Section 6
concludes.
1 Literature
The standard way of incorporating market frictions into asset pricing models is to assume
that trading involves some exogenous trading cost (or illiquidity cost).4 This implies
that investors’ expected holding period is crucial for the eﬀect of illiquidity on required
returns, i.e. the more often investors plan to trade, the more important are the trading
costs. The importance of illiquidity costs therefore depends on the assumed structure
of holding periods in a model. The simplest assumption possible is that the expected
holding period is exogenous and identical for all investors. Assuming risk neutrality,
these assumptions imply that the required return on assets is equal to the risk-free rate
plus the per period percentage transaction cost, see Amihud et al. (2005).5
In the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), risk-neutral investors are assumed
to have diﬀerent exogenous holding periods and limited capital. These assumptions
introduce a clientele eﬀect into the solution whereby investors with long expected holding
periods select stocks with high trading costs. The required return will then diﬀer for
diﬀerent classes of investors, and the expected gross return becomes an increasing and
concave function of the relative transaction cost. Amihud and Mendelson ﬁnd empirical
support for this hypothesis using spreads and stock returns from the NYSE over the
1961-80 period.6
4In fact, even the simple assumption that illiquidity reﬂects exogenous trading costs seriously com-
plicates standard asset pricing models. This is because it precludes the existence of a pricing kernel that
can price all securities. Explicit pricing rules can then only be derived under special assumptions, see
Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005).
5Risk neutrality implies that all assets are identical. Huang (2003) extends this analysis and studies
the premium for liquidity risk assuming exogenous holding periods and risk-averse investors.
6Several other papers attempt to test the model using turnover as a proxy for holding period. Atkins
and Dyl (1997) ﬁnd evidence consistent with the spread-holding period relationship using the inverse
of turnover as a proxy for the average holding period. Datar, Naik, and Radcliﬀe (1998) show that
turnover is negatively related to stock returns in the cross-section, while Hu (1997) ﬁnds support for
both an increasing and concave return-holding period relationship using data on returns and turnover
from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In the empirical test of their liquidity-adjusted CAPM, Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on prices from liquidity cost, also using turnover as proxy for
4On the other hand, more realistic models with endogenous holding periods and risk-
averse investors ﬁnd that an exogenous liquidity cost has only miniscule eﬀects on the level
of asset returns. In a continuous-time model with exogenous asset prices, Constantinides
(1986) shows that the optimal investment policy for risk-averse investors involves a trade-
oﬀ between high trading costs from frequent portfolio rebalancing and utility costs from
having a suboptimal asset allocation. While trading costs have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the
demand for the asset, they only have a second-order eﬀect on equilibrium asset returns.
Vayanos (1998) extends this analysis to a general equilibrium model with endogenous
holding periods. A calibration of his model gives a similar result; the eﬀects of trading
costs on equilibrium asset returns are small. Hence, we have the intriguing result that
more realistic models assuming risk aversion and endogenous holding periods seem to do
considerably worse in explaining empirical ﬁndings than less realistic models with risk
neutrality and exogenous holding periods.
Huang (2003) notes that an important reason behind the discrepancy between the-
ory and empirical ﬁndings regarding the eﬀect of liquidity on asset prices is that asset
pricing models in general cannot explain the observed high market trading volume. The
strong dependence of liquidity premia on investor holding periods implies that theories
that cannot account for observed high trading volume cannot explain observed liquid-
ity premia either. In a model with uncertain exogenous holding periods, Huang shows
that the premium for liquidity risk can be large if investors face liquidity shocks and are
constrained from borrowing.7
Another and potentially related explanation is the restriction in asset pricing models
that liquidity costs are exogenous. The market microstructure literature divides market
frictions into asymmetric information costs and coordination costs (inventory risk and
search problems), and shows that prices can diverge from long-term equilibrium values
due to strategic trading behavior of investors. Thus, models that do not specify the
ultimate source of trading cost diﬀerences cannot really explore how a full equilibrium
will look like. For instance, it is not obvious that investors with long expected holding
periods will select stocks with high trading costs since holding “long term” stocks reduces
the value of the option to sell the stocks early.
While much of our analysis is inspired by models starting from the Amihud and
Mendelson (1986) analysis, there are alternative formulations which may induce a link
between holding periods and returns. In a recent paper, Yan and Zhang (2008) start with
the premise of diﬀerently informed long term and short term investors, and show that
this has implications for returns.
investors’ average holding periods.
7Introducing additional motives for trade, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) also ﬁnd that the
liquidity premium can be large when investors have high frequency trading needs.
5Obviously, more knowledge about how and why expected holding periods diﬀer among
investors is highly valuable, and our paper signiﬁcantly adds to our knowledge on this.
There are two papers that are closely related to our analysis. Kyrolainen and Perttunen
(2006) looks at a dataset of Finnish investors and Dias and Ferreira (2005) at a dataset
of Portuguese investors. We expand on the analysis in these papers in a number of
ways. First, while both these papers ﬁnd some of the results we ﬁnd on the behaviour
of individual investors, neither of them go on to consider the wider implications of their
ﬁndings for the cross-section of stock returns. Second, we have a more comprehensive
sample of investors over a longer time period. Relative to the analysis of Kyrolainen and
Perttunen (2006) we use a more correct method of analysis, based on duration analysis,
which is also used in Dias and Ferreira (2005).
2 Market and data
The ﬁrms in the sample are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), which is a mod-
erately sized exchange by international standards. In 1997 (about the midpoint of our
sample), the 217 listed ﬁrms had an aggregate market capitalization which ranked the
OSE twelfth among the 21 European stock exchanges for which comparable data are
available. The number of companies on the exchange has increased from 141 in 1989 to
212 in 2003.8
This paper uses monthly data from the Norwegian equity market for the period
1992:12 to 2003:6. From the Norwegian Central Securities Registry (VPS) we have
monthly observations of the equity holdings of the complete stock market. At each
date we observe the number of stocks owned by every owner. Each owner has a unique
identiﬁer which allows us to follow the owners’ holdings over time. For each owner the
data include a sector code that allows us to distinguish between such types as mutual
fund owners, ﬁnancial owners (which include mutual funds), industrial (nonﬁnancial cor-
porate) owners, private (individual) owners, state owners and foreign owners. In addition
to this anonymous data set, we use public reports on individual owners’ inside transac-
tions to construct measures of insider ownership.9 A third data source is the Oslo Stock
Exchange Data Service (OBI). This source provides stock prices and accounting data.
Finally, we use interest rate data from Norges Bank, the Central Bank of Norway.
8For some information about the structure of the Norwegian stock market we refer to Bøhren and
Ødegaard (2000, 2001), and Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2008).
9For more details on this insider trading data see Eckbo and Smith (1998) and Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2001).
63 What aﬀects holding periods for individual investors?
In this section, we use duration analysis to describe actual holding periods and to study
what variables might aﬀect holding period decisions. By investigating whether the spread
is an important determinant of investors’ holding periods, we perform a direct test of the
spread-holding period relationship in Amihud and Mendelson (1986).
3.1 Duration analysis
The econometric framework suited for analyzing questions about the length of time an
investor chooses to keep his or her stake in a company, and what economic factors aﬀect
this decision, is duration (or survival) analysis. In duration analysis, one models the
decision to terminate a relationship. In our setting, termination is the decision to liquidate
an equity holding in a company.10
Duration analysis is the preferable method for analyzing holding period decisions
because it is designed to alleviate the problem of censoring. In our setting, the censoring
problem stems from the fact that we only observe investors for a limited period of time.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem. Of the investors illustrated in the ﬁgure, it is only
the holding period of investor A which will be measured correctly. The holding period of
investor B will be right censored; all we see is that the investor was present at the last date
and we do not know the ﬁnal termination date. For investor C we correctly observe the
terminal date, but we do not observe when the relationship is initiated, which is termed
left censoring. Duration analysis involves the estimation of the probability distribution
of the termination decision, taking the censoring problem into account.
This probability distribution of the termination decision can be characterized in a
number of ways, for example by the survival function: the probability of surviving beyond
a given date, or the hazard function: the probability of termination, conditional on having
survived so far. The most common way of characterizing the probability distribution is
through the hazard function. When we want to ask what factors aﬀect duration, this is
done by measuring a factor’s contribution to the hazard function.
10In economics, duration models are used on e.g. labor market data to analyze determinants of the
time spent unemployed, in which case the pertinent termination is movement between employment and
unemployment, see Lancaster (1979) and Nickell (1979) for examples and Kiefer (1988) and van den Berg
(2001) for surveys.
73.2 Estimated hazard and survival functions
We apply duration analysis to the holding periods of individual investors using monthly
data for all investors at the OSE over the period 1992-2003.11 To reduce noise, investors
with less than ﬁve hundred shares are removed from the sample. Thus, we count as ini-
tiation the ﬁrst time an investor is observed holding 500 or more shares, and termination
when he or she reduces the stake to less than 500 shares.12 This leaves about 1.4 million
observations of investor-company durations.13 In Table 1, we show mean and median
holding periods for all owners and for owners grouped by investor type, i.e. ﬁnancial,
foreign, nonﬁnancial, individual and state investors. The numbers in the table illustrate
some very interesting regularities in the data. For our purposes the most interesting
number is the median, which is the holding period of the typical investor. Looking at all
owners in the market, we ﬁnd that the typical investor holds a position for 0.75 years.
The median holding period varies signiﬁcantly by type of investor, however. The most
patient investors are private individuals, who hold their positions for 0.83 years, while the
typical corporate investor, be it ﬁnancial or nonﬁnancial, holds a position for only half a
year. Note also that the mean holding periods are considerably higher than the median
holding periods. Overall, the estimated mean holding period is close to 2 years, which is
more than twice the length of the median holding period.14 These ﬁndings clearly illus-
trate the skewed nature of the holding period distribution, where a few very long-term
investors inﬂate the mean holding period. This feature of the data points to the need to
use duration analysis to explicitly model the full distribution of holding periods, to which
we now turn.
In Figure 2, we show the estimated survival- and hazard functions for the complete
sample of investors. From the survival function, shown in the left panel of the ﬁgure, we
can read the median holding period of 0.75 from the point where the survival function
crosses the 0.5 line. Other interesting properties of holding periods are, however, better
illustrated by the hazard function shown in the right panel of the ﬁgure.15 If the proba-
11In survival analysis terms, our data set is a an example of spell data, where there is interval censoring
since we only observe once every month, and there are some (identiﬁed) spells which may be left or right
censored. While the interval censoring could be analyzed using discrete methods, we have for simplicity
chosen to approximate the survival function as continuous.
12At the Oslo Stock Exchange, the typical minimal trading lot is 100 shares. Requiring ﬁve times the
minimum lot size seems like a conservative lower limit on who is a “substantial” owner. Looking only at
complete sellouts of stakes is of course a simple deﬁnition of termination. One could think of alternatives,
such as a stake decrease by a given percentage.
13An investor can have several durations, both in the same and in other stocks.
14The estimate of 1.97 is adjusted for the censoring of data by extrapolation. Without censoring
adjustment the estimate is 1.86.
15The hazard functions that follow are estimated using a Weibull probability distribution assumption.
We have also looked at alternatives, such as a Cox speciﬁcation. The results are robust to these alternative
probability distributions.
8bilities of liquidating an equity position, conditional on the length of time the ownership
has lasted, are time independent, the hazard function will be ﬂat. This is clearly not
the case for our sample. Instead, we see a systematic time variation. The conditional
probability of exit starts around 0.45, increasing to a maximum slightly above 0.5 around
1 year, and then decreases steadily, reaching 0.2 after 8 years, and keeps decreasing. The
decreasing part of the curve after 1 year means that if an owner has held the stock for one
year, he or she is less and less likely to terminate as time passes. The high probability of
exit at the short horizon is the prime contributor to stock turnover. Over the same time
period, the average annual stock turnover was about 60%.16
3.3 Determinants of the hazard function
Having described holding periods, we now turn to investigating what variables might
aﬀect the holding period decision. Duration analysis lets us ask this question by esti-
mating the eﬀect of a variable on the hazard function. In the standard speciﬁcation of
duration analysis, the hazard function is a constant function of the explanatory variables.
We use time-varying explanatory variables such as ﬁrm size, stock volatility and spread
in our analysis. To implement estimation we use the observed values of an explanatory
variable at the time when a stake is ﬁrst acquired as the input to the estimation. In eco-
nomic terms this can be viewed as the holding period decision being based on observable
variables when the initial stake is acquired.
By including spread as an explanatory variable, we perform a direct test of the spread-
holding period relationship in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Earlier empirical analysis,
such as Atkins and Dyl (1997), tests this relationship using turnover as a proxy for
holding period. Our paper improves on this analysis in two respects. First, we base
the analysis on actual holding periods at the individual investor level. Second, we use
the correct econometric framework for testing. The question of whether liquidity aﬀects
holding periods should be asked by testing whether the liquidity at the time when the
stock position is entered into aﬀects the hazard function for holding periods. In their
analysis, Amihud and Mendelson use spread as their liquidity measure. In our analysis
we consider both spread and turnover as liquidity measures.
In Amihud and Mendelson (1986), investors coming to the market have diﬀerent ex-
pected holding periods. One rationale for this assumption could be that diﬀerent groups
16It should be mentioned that there are some problems with the analysis at the very short end, induced
by the fact that the minimum possible observation of holding period is one month. Since we only have
monthly observations of holdings our minimal estimate of holding period is one month, found when we
have only two consecutive observations of stock holdings. Cases where we only have one observation,
with no observation of holdings for that owner either the month prior or the month after, are rounded
down to a duration of zero. Zero durations are not used in the estimation.
9of investors have distinctly diﬀerent trading motives, for instance long-term pension sav-
ing versus short-term speculation. To account for these possibilities we consider investor
type as an explanatory variable. Investor type is included in our analysis in two diﬀer-
ent ways. First, we use dummy variables for investor type in the estimation. However,
since we are estimating a nonlinear relationship, dummy variables may not capture all
the relevant information. We therefore also perform the analysis separately for the ﬁve
diﬀerent owner types.
It is also possible that an investor’s planned holding period is inﬂuenced by the size
of the investment. We therefore include investment amount as an explanatory variable.
Since we only have monthly observations of holdings, we estimate the investment amount
as the stock price at the end of the month multiplied by the number of shares. To avoid
numerical diﬃculties we use the log of the investment.
In panel A of Table 2 we show the results from estimating the contributions to the
hazard function of the investor-speciﬁc variables described above as well as two liquidity
measures, relative spread (columns 2-3) and turnover (columns 4-5). The coeﬃcients in
the table measure contributions to the hazard function. Note here the interpretation of
these coeﬃcients: If a coeﬃcient equals one, it does not contribute. A coeﬃcient less
than one lowers the conditional probability of exit, while a coeﬃcient greater than one
increases the probability of exit.
Let us ﬁrst look at the estimated relationship between spread and holding period.
As seen in the table, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly below one. High spread decreases
the probability of exit. We therefore conﬁrm the posited relationship between spread
and holding period. Stocks with high spreads tend to have owners with longer holding
periods. Similarly, stocks which have recently experienced high turnover tend to have
owners with shorter holding periods looking forward. The other explanatory variables
in the regressions are all signiﬁcant. The amount invested has a negative eﬀect on the
hazard function. This means that larger owners tend to have longer holding periods.
The analysis also shows clear diﬀerences across investor types in average holding periods.
Financial owners are the shortest term, while individual owners have the longest holding
periods. Foreign and non-ﬁnancial (corporate) owners have holding periods in between
these two extremes.
In the estimation above, we only use investor-speciﬁc information and liquidity mea-
sures as explanatory variables. However, other properties of a stock may also be relevant
for holding period decisions. To account for this, we add a few ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables to
the analysis. Following Atkins and Dyl (1997), we include logs of stock volatility and
ﬁrm size as possible determinants of holding period. In panel B of Table 2 we show the
results when these two variables are added for two diﬀerent analyzes of determinants of
10the hazard function, one using the spread as a liquidity measure, the other using turnover.
In both speciﬁcations, volatility and ﬁrm size are signiﬁcantly related to holding period.
The holding periods tend to be shorter in ﬁrms with high volatility and large size. Note
also that foreign ownership no longer is signiﬁcant. This is probably because it is corre-
lated with ﬁrm size. However, for our purposes the most important observation is that
there is still a signiﬁcant relation between liquidity and holding period. Ex ante liquidity
aﬀects realized holding periods.
The dummy variables for investor type show signiﬁcant diﬀerences across owner types;
however, as noted above, simple dummy variables may not capture diﬀerences in the
shape of the hazard function for the diﬀerent owner types. We therefore redo the hazard
function estimation for each of the ﬁve subsamples. Figure 3 and Table 3 show the results.
There are some diﬀerences across owner types worth pointing out. The fact that ﬁnancial
and nonﬁnancial owners are relatively more impatient is seen by the higher values of the
hazard function at the short end. Another interesting feature is the diﬀerence in the
contribution of the investment amount across owner types. For individual owners, we
ﬁnd that the larger the initial investment the longer the holding period. For all the other
owner types this relation is opposite. Larger investments tend to lead to shorter holding
periods. This can be due to the importance of the investment in the portfolio of individual
investors. While there are some diﬀerences across owner type, there are no diﬀerences in
the relationship of most interest for our purposes. We see that ex ante liquidity is still
an important determinant of future holding periods.
To conclude, there are two important results in this section that add to our knowledge
of the link between holding periods and stock liquidity. First, we show that the conditional
probability distribution of holding periods has a clear time variation. Most owners are
short term; the typical owner keeps the position for three quarters of a year. But there is
also a group of very long-term owners. In our sample, about 10% of the owners kept their
positions for the whole sample period of ten years. Second, we show that stock liquidity,
be it measured by spread or turnover, inﬂuences holding period decisions.
4 Proxies of holding periods
In this section we use our data on holding periods to shed light on the relationship
between holding period and diﬀerent measures of liquidity. First, we investigate whether
the inverse of turnover is a good proxy for holding period as suggested by Atkins and Dyl
(1997). We show that the proxy seriously overstates actual holding periods of individual
investors. Second, we consider ranking of the cross-section of equities by measures of
holding periods, and ask to what extent this ranking is related to rankings by standard
11liquidity measures. To perform such an analysis it is necessary to construct a measure
that aggregates individual holding periods into a measure of holding periods at the stock
level.
4.1 Estimating holding period from stock turnover
Atkins and Dyl (1997) use the inverse of annual turnover as an estimate of the average
holding period of a ﬁrm’s investors, i.e.
Holding Periodt =
Shares outstanding in year t
No of shares traded in year t
and argue that this is a reasonable approximation of holding periods when investigating
the relationship between transactions costs and investors’ holding periods. As we shall see,
however, the validity of this argument depends crucially on the distributional properties
of actual holding periods.
Atkins and Dyl estimate average holding periods from a sample of US ﬁrms listed
on NYSE and Nasdaq. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation and compare them
with similar estimates for Norway. Estimating average holding period from turnover, we
ﬁnd an average across stocks of 3.33 years. However, as illustrated by the histogram in
ﬁgure 4, the mean of this distribution is seriously pushed upward by a few very large
estimates. The median of 1.96 is therefore a much better estimate of the typical holding
period estimated from turnover. When we relate this result to the estimation of mean and
median holding periods based on individual owners, we note the following. The estimate
of the typical holding period based on turnover (1.97) hits the mean holding period
for individual investors uncannily on the spot (1.96). The two estimates are therefore
consistent with each other. However, from our data on actual holding periods, we know
that this estimate of the mean holding period is seriously inﬂated by a few long-term
investors. Put diﬀerently, the estimate based on turnover is not able to distinguish the
more complex dynamics of holding periods we ﬁnd from the data for individual investors,
where we have a large group of short-term, impatient investors, and a smaller group of
much longer term, patient investors. Thus, we cannot detect the typical holding period
of 0.75 years using turnover data.
In the next section, we investigate to what degree data on individual owners’ holding
periods give additional, and diﬀerent, information, than what we can ﬁnd from turnover.
124.2 What is the relationship between actual holding periods and
liquidity measures?
In this subsection, we shift focus from the holding period of individual owners to holding
periods as an aggregate property of all the owners of a stock. The impetus for these
analyzes comes from the empirical asset pricing evidence of a positive relationship between
asset prices and microstructure measures of liquidity. If liquidity is an exogenous trading
cost, as assumed in the theoretical asset pricing literature, then the link between liquidity
and asset prices must be one of cost compensation. This cost compensation will vary with
investors’ expected holding period. We therefore want to investigate whether liquidity
covaries with holding periods as such theories suggest. To investigate this we need a
measure of average holding period at the stock level.
4.2.1 An index of average holding period at the stock level
To get a measure of holding period that we can relate to measures of stock liquidity,
that are measured over short time intervals, we construct a holding period index. The
measure is constructed as a “snapshot”, where we take the owners at a given date, measure
the holding period for each owner, and aggregate these individuals into one measure per
stock. To lessen time series overlap, we truncate the measurement interval to one year at
a time.17
Figure 5 illustrates our method for creating the index. At a given date t we use data
for the holdings in the previous year. We take all owners with an equity stake at time
t.18 In the ﬁgure it means that we use owners 1, 3 and 4. Owner 2 has sold her stake 6
months earlier, and is not present in the company at date t. The holding period index
for each owner is the holding period in fractions of a year. The index for the company is
a weighted sum of the individual owners’ indices. In the example in ﬁgure 5 the holding
period index is







where wi is the weight for owner i. The weight for each individual can vary. If we want
to put more weight on the large owners we use value weights where the fraction of the
company held by each owner at time t is the weight. This index is termed hpi(vw). If we
are more interested in the typical owner we use equal weights 1=n, where n is the number
of owners in the sample at time t. This index is termed hpi(ew).
17All holding periods above 1 are therefore truncated. One way to think about this is that we say any
holding period more than one year is “long term,” without distinguishing further. This is justiﬁed by the
results on individual owners, where more than half of the owners had a holding period of less than two
thirds of a year.
18To reduce noise we require that the number of shares is above a threshold of 500 shares.
13We calculate holding period indices for each ﬁrm in the sample. We do it for both
the equally weighted index hpi(ew) and the value weighted index hpi(vw). Figure 6
shows the distribution of the two. Note the diﬀerence between the value weighted and
equally weighted indices. That the value weighted index is more concentrated on the
longer period must be caused by the larger owners tending to stay longer. This suggests
a tendency that large owners have longer holding periods than small owners, a result we
saw for individual owners in the determinants of the hazard function.
4.2.2 What determines the holding period indices?
A simple way of evaluating how the holding period index varies with other ﬁrm char-
acteristics is by stratifying the sample of ﬁrms based on the characteristic we want to
investigate, and calculate averages for each group. Panel A of table 5 implements this for a
number of diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics: ﬁrm size, stock volatility, book-to-market (B/M)
ratio, ﬁrm age, insider ownership and ownership concentration. The average holding pe-
riods seem higher for the smallest and largest quartiles of the ﬁrms. A similar pattern is
true for volatility. The average holding period for value stocks (high B/M) seems to be
longer than the average holding period for growth stocks. Firm age also seems important;
the older the ﬁrm, the longer the average holding period. The last two variables, insider
ownership and ownership concentration, show no obvious systematic patterns.
To test more formally the importance of the explanatory variables, we also run a
multivariate regression for each of the two holding period indices. Panel B of table 5
shows the results for this estimation. Old ﬁrms and value stocks tend to have owners
with longer average holding periods than young ﬁrms and growth stocks. Surprisingly, we
ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on the ﬁrm size (though only signiﬁcant for the equally weighted
index). Thus, we ﬁnd weak evidence that larger ﬁrms have shorter duration ownership
than smaller ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is at odds with the evidence in Atkins and Dyl (1997) as
well as with several suggested explanations for the opposite result that large ﬁrms should
have long duration owners than smaller ﬁrms (including less risk, reduced divergence
of investors’ expectations, and less need for portfolio re-balancing due to more stable
return distribution parameters). The two variables thought to be related to asymmetric
information, stock volatility and insider ownership, do not seem to explain averages of
holding periods for ﬁrms’ owners. Finally, the size of the largest owner is important; the
larger this owner, the longer the average holding period.
144.2.3 The relation between holding period index and other liquidity mea-
sures
To investigate the relationship between liquidity measures and holding period, we look at
the covariability between these measures, and compare the properties of liquidity, such
as the liquidity’s determinants, to similar estimations for holding period indices.
We consider three diﬀerent measures of liquidity: turnover, relative spread, and amor-
tized spread. The turnover and relative spread are standard measures, and will not be
discussed further. The amortized spread is particularly interesting for our purposes, as
it attempts to measure an expected cost of trading equity that takes into account the
holding period of a position. As such it can be viewed as an attempt to make trading
costs across stocks comparable by looking at expected costs over a deﬁned time interval,
such as a year. The amortized spread measure was introduced in Chalmers and Kadlec
(1998), and is roughly equal to the bid/ask spread multiplied by turnover.19
Panel A in table 6 shows stratiﬁed averages of holding period indices. We see that
stocks with low turnover have longer holding period indices and that holding period is
increasing in the spread. These observations are conﬁrmed by the correlation coeﬃcients
in panel B of the table. All the coeﬃcients have the expected signs. Note that in the cross-
section, the correlation between turnover and the holding period indices is only around
 0:5. This shows that turnover is an imperfect measure of holding period. Interestingly,
the amortized spread has a very low correlation with the holding period indices. However,
when we look at the quartiles of hpi there seems to be some systematic covariation
between hpi and amortized spread.
To further investigate the links between the holding period indices and the liquidity
measures we analyze the determinants of turnover and spreads in the same way as we did
for the holding period indices. The results from this analysis are presented in tables 7
and 8, and should be compared to similar regressions for holding periods reported in
table 5. As the tables show, the liquidity variables seem to have similar determinants as
19Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) used trading data to calculate the amortized spread for date T as
AST =
PT
t=1 jPt   MtjVt
PT  SharesOutT
where AST is the amortized spread, Pt is a transaction price, Mt a midpoint price, Vt a trade quantity
and SharesOut is the number of shares outstanding. Observation T is the last observation of the day.








 Relative bid/ask spread  Turnover
Multiplying this by 252 gives a daily estimate of the annualized amortized spread. We use averages of
this measure over a time period in most of our analysis.
15the holding period indices; ﬁrm size, B/M ratio, and the size of the largest owner are all
signiﬁcant determinants of both turnover and spread.
We also show, in table 9, results from adding liquidity variables to the series of ex-
planatory variables used in the regressions presented in panel B of table 5. The liquidity
variables are clearly signiﬁcant determinants of the holding period indices, but most of
the other variables are still signiﬁcant.
5 The role of holding period for asset pricing
In this section we investigate the links between liquidity, holding period and asset returns.
As was discussed brieﬂy in the literature section, there are diﬀerent possible reasons for
holding periods to be linked to asset prices.
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) formalize the idea of a positive relationship between
expected returns net of trading costs and the holding period. Two propositions are derived
from their model. Proposition 1 states the spread-holding period relationship tested in
subsection 3.3; assets with higher spreads should be allocated to portfolios with the same
or longer expected holding periods. Proposition 2 states that observed asset returns
should be an increasing and concave function of the relative spread. Jointly these two
propositions imply that observed asset returns must also be an increasing and concave
function of the expected holding period.20 This relationship between holding period
and asset returns is investigated by Datar et al. (1998), who ﬁnd support for the joint
proposition in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). However, they use turnover as a proxy for
holding period, and as we have shown the correspondence between holding period and
turnover is less than perfect.21
Yan and Zhang (2008) provide an alternative explanation for a link between holding
period and asset prices. Their empirical analysis suggest that short-term institutions
are better informed and exploit their informational advantage by active trading. These
results suggest that there might be returns diﬀerences between the portfolios of long and
short term investors due to diﬀerences in information.
In this section we ask whether asset prices in the cross section is related to holding
period diﬀerences across stocks. In a sense our analysis is exploratory, we simply ask to
what extent holding periods, as opposed to liquidity, matters for asset prices.
20Suppose that assets held by investors with a long expected holding period have the same or lower
returns than assets held by investors with a short expected investment horizon. From Proposition 1,
the assets held by the long term investors must have the highest spread. But then Proposition 2 cannot
hold.
21The results in Datar et al. (1998) might instead be interpreted as supportive to Proposition 2 in the
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model with turnover as an alternative proxy for liquidity.
16To investigate this, we perform various asset pricing investigations. First, we perform
a simple analysis of the cross-section of stock returns based on portfolio sorting. All
stocks are sorted into portfolios based on ﬁve criteria: turnover, relative bid/ask spread,
amortized spread, and the two holding period indices hpi(ew) and hpi(vw). The port-
folio sorts are performed at year end. We then calculate portfolio returns for the next
year before rebalancing the portfolios. We then calculate the averages of the excess re-
turns for these ﬁve portfolio sorts and look for a systematic variation in excess returns.
Table 10 shows the results from this analysis. For the portfolios sorted on the holding
period indices, we ﬁnd no clear pattern in excess returns. However, for all three liquidity
measures we ﬁnd a clear systematic variation: the better the liquidity of a portfolio, the
lower its excess returns.
While the orderings in panel A in table 10 are indicative, they are not suﬃcient to
conclude that the holding period measures do a worse job in the cross-section. They may
merely reﬂect diﬀerences in risk. We therefore need to embed the question in a formal
asset pricing analysis. There are numerous ways this type of analysis can be performed.
We ﬁrst do a simple correction for the three factor Fama and French (1995) model, by
calculating returns in excess of the Fama French model. Averages of these excess returns
are reported in panel B of table 10. While these numbers are more noisy than the returns
in excess of the risk free rate, since the Fama French parameters are estimated, they still
give the same impression as the results in panel A, the sorts using the holding period
indices have less clear relationships with (Fama French) excess returns than the more
standard liquidity measures.
As a diﬀerent way of asking the same question, we ask whether we can use portfolios
sorted by liquidity/holding period to construct a pricing factor that helps explain the
cross-section of stock returns. The construction of this “liquidity factor” (LIQ) is done by
a sort similar to the Carhart (1997) construction, where we at year-end sort the stocks
based on the relevant liquidity/holding period measure, and take the diﬀerence in returns
between the 30% top and 30% bottom stocks. This liquidity factor is then used as an
explanatory variable in a joint estimation of the system
E[r] = 
r = a + f
where f is the vector of pricing factors, and  (factor loadings) and  (betas) are jointly
estimated. This is a well known formulation, see Cochrane (2005) for elucidation of the
procedure. In our formulation, we use two elements in f. One is the standard use of a
market portfolio, where we use an equally weighted market portfolio for the Oslo Stock
Exchange. The second is the constructed factor based on liquidity or holding period
17(LIQ). For our purposes, the interesting question is whether diﬀerent versions of the LIQ
factor is priced in the cross-section, which is to test whether  is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in an estimation on a set of test assets. As argued by Cochrane (2005), one
should use a set of test assets with a decent cross-sectional variation. We therefore use
a set of size-sorted portfolios.22 Table 11 shows the complete results of the estimation
where we apply the market factor and a LIQ factor constructed from relative spread to
eight size-sorted portfolios.
We observe that both the market portfolio and the liquidity factor are signiﬁcant
determinants of the cross-section. The market risk premium is positive, as it should be.
More importantly, for our purposes, is the fact that the liquidity risk premium is positive
and signiﬁcant. The importance of the liquidity factor is conﬁrmed by the estimated betas
for the size-portfolios on the liquidity factor. Many of these are signiﬁcant. Hence, we ﬁnd
that a liquidity factor constructed from relative spread helps to explain the cross-section
of returns of size-based portfolios.
We then repeat this exercise for four alternative measures of liquidity: turnover,
amortized spread, hpi(ew) and hpi(vw). The results are summarized in table 12. For
brevity, we only report estimates of  for the liquidity factor, and estimates of the factor
premia . To facilitate comparison, we also include the estimation using the LIQ factor
estimated using the relative spread.
For our purposes, the most interesting result in Table 12 is the fact that while the
liquidity factors constructed from spread and amortized spread are very signiﬁcant de-
terminants of the cross-section, the factors constructed from holding periods are not sig-
niﬁcant. This investigation reinforces our earlier ﬁnding that the holding period indices
do a worse job than more standard liquidity measures in asset pricing applications.23
6 Conclusion
We use a data set of the complete holdings of all investors in a stock market to look
at expected holding periods for individual investors. We show how these decisions of
individual investors sum up to a measure of average holding period at the stock level,
and investigate the links between stock liquidity, holding periods, and asset returns.
We make a number of important contributions to the literature. First, we characterize
22Empirical evidence, in e.g. Næs et al. (2008), shows that ﬁrm size is a signiﬁcant determinant of the
cross-section of Norwegian stock returns.
23We have implemented various other asset pricing tests, such as a Fama and MacBeth (1973) for-
mulation and a direct estimation of the components of the discount factor m, without the additional
structure of the factor premia. We have also included the standard Fama French factors SMB and HML in
the analysis. In all cases the holding period indices are less signiﬁcant than the other liquidity measures,
in particular the spread measures, although there are cases where neither of them are signiﬁcant.
18the distribution of holding periods using duration analysis. Using these methods we
show that the median holding period is only 0.75 years. However, due to a very skewed
distribution, the average holding period is close to 2 years. This number is also what would
be estimated from (median) turnover. We also show that what is driving these results is
a pattern of time variation in the conditional probability of selling the equity position.
There is a high probability of exit the ﬁrst year, and then steadily declining probability of
exit once the stock has been held for a year. We also analyze the holding period decisions
of individual investors and show that liquidity is an important determinant of holding
periods for individual investors. Controlling for various investor speciﬁc and ﬁrm speciﬁc
variables, we ﬁnd that low liquidity (high bid/ask spread and/or low turnover) of a stock
when the investor enters into a stock position, tends to result in a longer holding period.
A second contribution is related to the relationship between holding period and
turnover. Current empirical literature on the links between holding periods and asset
returns has used the inverse of turnover at the stock level as a proxy for expected holding
periods for the individual investors of the stock (Atkins and Dyl, 1997). Based on the
ﬁnding that the correlation coeﬃcient between turnover and holding period indices con-
structed from data on actual holding periods lies around  0:5, we argue that turnover is
only an imperfect measure of expected holding periods.
Our third contribution is to provide empirical evidence that the link between liquidity
and asset prices is not explained by investors who want compensation for exogenous
trading costs. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that the link between transaction
costs (spreads) and returns works through investors’ selection of stocks based on their
expected holding periods. If this is the case, we should see that the average holding period
in a stock is an important determinant of the cross section of stock returns. However,
when we compare our measures of average holding period and more traditional measures
of liquidity, such as spread and turnover, as determinants of the cross-section of stock
returns, we ﬁnd that the more traditional liquidity measures have much stronger links to
asset returns.
While our results are still preliminary, there are some interesting avenues for further
research. As discussed in the introduction, the Amihud and Mendelson model does not
explain why there is a spread, just that diﬀerent spreads can be sustainable when investors
select stocks with diﬀerent spreads based on their expected holding periods. A more
complete model would also incorporate the cause of liquidity (spread) diﬀerences. A
typical microstructure model would attribute these causes to information risk. We ﬁnd
that liquidity strongly aﬀects holding periods. At the same time, we ﬁnd little evidence
of a link between holding periods and returns, and a strong link between returns and
traditional microstructure liquidity variables. A possible explanation for these results is
19that the cause of the ﬁrst eﬀect is the Amihud and Mendelson intuition, investors reacting
to spreads, while returns and microstructure liquidity are linked through the cause of
spread diﬀerences. Trying to disentangle these eﬀects seems a promising direction to go.
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Calendar time 1992 2003
The ﬁgure illustrates some conceptual problems in our estimation of holding periods using monthly observations. In
calendar time our sample starts in 1992:12 and ends in 2003:6. We illustrate the holding periods of 3 example investors, A,
B and C. For investor A the holding period is contained within 1992–2003, and therefore estimated correctly. For investor
B we correctly observe the initial date but as the investor keeps his stake until after the last date, all we know is that we
observe the stake on the last date. The holding period of this owners is underestimated due to right censoring. For owner
C we correctly observe the terminal date, but we do not observe the ﬁrst date, only that this owner was present in the ﬁrst
date of the sample, in 1992:12. Hence the holding period is underestimated due to left censoring.
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Smoothed hazard estimate
Estimated survival and hazard functions using all investor-company holding periods at the OSE in the period. The ﬁgure
on the left is the estimated survival function. The ﬁgure on the right is the estimated hazard function. Analysis time in
years. The analysis is based on 1,417,186 observations. The estimates are corrected for right censoring. The estimation
uses a Weibull probability function. The analysis is performed using Stata9. The analysis uses monthly data from the
Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
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Smoothed hazard estimate
We show estimated hazard functions for separate estimations for the ﬁve owner types. The estimation uses a Weibull
probability function. Financial owners: Mutual funds, banks and insurance companies. Foreign owners: Owners domiciled
outside of Norway, both corporations and individuals. Nonﬁnancial owners: Industrial owners (corporations that are not
ﬁnancials). Individual owners: Private individuals/families. State owners: Public owners, including public pension funds.
The analysis is performed using Stata9. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period
1992:12 to 2003:6.
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The histogram shows the distribution of estimates of the average holding period of investors. Holding period is estimated
as one divided by annual turnover. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12
to 2003:6.









The ﬁgure illustrates our method for creating a holding period index. We illustrate four example owners, 1–4. We look
at all owners during the year, and calculate each owner’s holding period in fractions of the year. For owner 1 the holding
period is 1, for owner 2 it is 5/12, for owner 3 it is 7/12, and for owner 4 it is 3/12. A holding period index is calculated at
time t. We only use the owners present at time t, and calculate the weighted average of holding periods for the individual




12. We use two diﬀerent weights. The ﬁrst is equal weights. The resulting index is
denoted hpi(ew). The second is value weights: each owner receive weights based on the fraction of the company that owner
holds at date t. The resulting index is denoted hpi(vw).
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Histograms of the holding period indices hpi(ew) and hpi(vw). The indices are calculated for each company at year end.
The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages of holding period length at the stock level calculated over a period of one
year by taking all owners observed at the ﬁnal date and taking the average holding period over the period for these owners.
The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted average and the index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. . The analysis uses
monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Figure 6: The distribution of holding period indicesOwner type median mean no obs
All 0.75 1.97 1489365
State 0.75 1.79 5860
Foreign 0.67 1.61 156561
Financial 0.50 1.29 62357
Nonﬁnancial 0.50 1.45 204587
Individual 0.83 2.18 1055928
The table describes the estimated holding periods (survival times) for all investors and for the ﬁve diﬀerent investor types
state, ﬁnancial, foreign, nonﬁnancial and individual. We show the median holding period and the mean holding period. The
estimate of the mean is adjusted for right censoring by extrapolation, as described in the Stata manual. Financial owners:
Mutual funds, banks and insurance companies. Foreign owners: Owners domiciled outside of Norway, both corporations
and individuals. Nonﬁnancial owners: Industrial owners (corporations that are not ﬁnancials). Individual owners: Private
individuals/families. State owners: Public owners, including public pension funds. The analysis is performed using Stata9.
The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for estimated holding periodsPanel A: Investor-speciﬁc variables and liquidity
Variable Haz. Ratio pvalue Haz. Ratio pvalue
ln(Investment) 0.9773 (0.00) 0.9915 (0.00)
Financial 1.1770 (0.00) 1.1579 (0.00)
Foreign 0.9462 (0.00) 0.9362 (0.00)
Nonﬁnancial 1.0851 (0.00) 1.0741 (0.00)
Individual 0.7165 (0.00) 0.7114 (0.00)
Bid Ask Spread 0.5221 (0.00)
Turnover 1.1952 (0.00)
n 1417186 1417186
Panel B: Investor-speciﬁc variables, ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, and liquidity
Variable Haz. Ratio pvalue
ln(Investment) 0.9829 (0.00) 0.9887 (0.00)
Financial 1.1916 (0.00) 1.2069 (0.00)
Foreign 0.9932 (0.61) 0.9993 (0.95)
Nonﬁnancial 1.1157 (0.00) 1.1356 (0.00)
Individual 0.7551 (0.00) 0.7598 (0.00)
ln(Volatility) 1.4317 (0.00) 1.2192 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 1.0097 (0.00) 1.0411 (0.00)
Bid Ask spread 0.0034 (0.00)
Turnover 1.2288 (0.00)
n 1038170
The tables show the results for two separate analyzes of contributions to the hazard function illustrated in ﬁgure 2. The
contribution to the hazard function is estimated using a Weibull probability speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcients for each variable
have the following interpretation: A number less than one in numerical value lowers the probability of exit, inducing a
longer holding period. A number greater than one induces a shorter holding period. In Panel A, the explanatory variables
include investment size, owner type, and liquidity. In Panel B, we include volatility and ﬁrm size as explanatory variables
in addition to investment size, owner type, and liquidity. Columns 2 and 3 show the results when we use the bid/ask spread
as our measure of liquidity, while columns 4 and 5 show the results when we measure liquidity by turnover. Investment:
The amount invested in that stock by the given owner, Financial: Dummy variable equal to one if the given owner is a
ﬁnancial corporation, Foreign: Dummy variable equal to one if the given owner is foreign, Individual: Dummy variable
equal to one if the given owner is an individual (family) owner, Nonﬁnancial: Dummy variable equal to one if the given
owner is a nonﬁnancial corporation, Stock Volatility: Volatility of the stock’s returns, estimated using one year of returns,
Firm Size: The value of the company’s equity, Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa   Pb)=Pt, averaged over a
year and Turnover: Number of shares traded in the stock during one year divided by number of shares outstanding. The
analysis is performed using Stata9. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12
to 2003:6.
Table 2: Determinants of the hazard functionPanel A: Determinants of the hazard function using spread as liquidity mea-
sure
Investor type: Financial Foreign Nonﬁnancial Individual State
Variable Hazard p- Haz pval Haz pval Haz pval Haz pvalu
Ratio value
ln(Investment) 1.0046 (0.09) 1.0511 (0.00) 1.0602 (0.00) 0.9494 (0.00) 1.0308 (0.00)
ln(Volatility) 1.1922 (0.00) 1.2009 (0.00) 1.2027 (0.00) 1.3476 (0.00) 1.0069 (0.87)
ln(Firm Size) 0.9567 (0.00) 1.0005 (0.86) 1.0170 (0.00) 1.0188 (0.00) 0.9429 (0.00)
Rel B/A spread 0.0050 (0.00) 0.1134 (0.00) 0.0141 (0.00) 0.0259 (0.00) 0.0001 (0.00)
n 48246 116750 154961 711225 4829
Panel B: Determinants of the hazard function using turnover as liquidity
measure
Investor type: Financial Foreign Nonﬁnancial Individual State
Variable Haz. Ratio pvalue Haz pval Haz pval Haz pval Haz pvalu
ln(Investment) 1.0041 (0.13) 1.0530 (0.00) 1.0605 (0.00) 0.9568 (0.00) 1.0241 (0.00)
ln(Volatility) 1.0595 (0.00) 1.1127 (0.00) 1.0816 (0.00) 1.1987 (0.00) 0.8294 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.9884 (0.00) 1.0132 (0.00) 1.0441 (0.00) 1.0352 (0.00) 0.9990 (0.93)
Turnover 1.1492 (0.00) 1.1363 (0.00) 1.1634 (0.00) 1.1593 (0.00) 1.2645 (0.00)
n 48244 116711 154944 711176 4829
The tables show the results for ﬁve separate analyzes of contributions to the hazard functions illustrated in ﬁgure 3. The
contribution to the hazard function is estimated using a Weibull probability speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcients for each variable
have the following interpretation: A number less than one in numerical value lowers the probability of exit, inducing a longer
holding period. A number greater than one induces a shorter holding period. The explanatory variables are investment
size, volatility, ﬁrm size and liquidity. In Panel A we use the relative spread as the liquidity measure. In panel B we use
turnover as the liquidity measure. Investment: The amount invested in that stock by the given owner. Stock Volatility:
Volatility of the stock’s returns, estimated using one year of returns. Firm Size: The value of the company’s equity.
Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa   Pb)=Pt, averaged over a year. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the
stock during one year divided by number of shares outstanding. Financial owners: Mutual funds, banks and insurance
companies. Foreign owners: Owners domiciled outside of Norway, both corporations and individuals. Nonﬁnancial owners:
Industrial owners (corporations that are not ﬁnancials). Individual owners: Private individuals/families. State owners:
Public owners, including public pension funds. The analysis is performed using Stata9. The analysis uses monthly data
from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 3: Determinants of hazard function estimated separately for each investor typeNYSE Nasdaq OSE
1975-1989 1983-1991 1992-2003
Average 6.99 4.01 3.33
Median 3.38 2.43 1.96
The table describes estimates of the average holding period of a stock’s investors using the method of Atkins and Dyl
(1997), where holding period is estimated as one divided by annual turnover, and compare it to data for the US, from
Atkins and Dyl (1997).
Table 4: Average holding periods estimated as in Atkins and Dyl (1997)Panel A: Stratiﬁed quartiles
hpi(ew) hpi(vw)
All 1 2 3 4 All 1 2 3 4
Firm Size 0.580 0.629 0.558 0.543 0.595 0.674 0.685 0.658 0.674 0.697
Stock Volatility 0.570 0.630 0.548 0.522 0.579 0.682 0.714 0.667 0.664 0.684
BM Ratio 0.577 0.463 0.565 0.599 0.651 0.685 0.640 0.690 0.695 0.706
Firm listing age 0.579 0.477 0.554 0.610 0.642 0.672 0.616 0.657 0.680 0.717
Primary insider fraction 0.577 0.580 0.590 0.588 0.562 0.672 0.671 0.670 0.672 0.672
Largest owner 0.580 0.582 0.539 0.603 0.599 0.678 0.663 0.645 0.713 0.691
Panel B: Regression models
hpi(ew) hpi(vw)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.767 (0.00) 0.548 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.023 (0.00) -0.000 (0.98)
Stock Volatility 0.579 (0.07) 0.414 (0.14)
BM Ratio 0.059 (0.00) 0.036 (0.00)
ln(Firm listing age) 0.102 (0.00) 0.038 (0.00)
Primary insider fraction -0.122 (0.07) 0.056 (0.36)
Largest owner 0.112 (0.00) 0.130 (0.00)
n 1118 1118
R2 0.30 0.11
The tables show how the holding period indices covary with ﬁrm characteristics. The top table (panel A) shows averages
of holding period indices in stratiﬁed samples. For each line we group the stocks in the sample in four quartiles by the
criterion listed on the left. We then calculate averages of holding period indices for each of the four groups. The quartiles
are sorted in increasing value. So, for example, in the ﬁrst line quartile 1 is the group with the smallest companies, and
quartile 4 contains the largest ﬁrms. The bottom table (panel B) shows results of two independent regressions showing
how the holding period indices listed at the top of each column are determined by the explanatory variables listed in the
rows. The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages of holding period length at the stock level calculated over a period
of one year by taking all owners observed at the ﬁnal date and taking the average holding period over the period for these
owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted average and the index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. . Firm Size:
The value of the company’s equity. Stock Volatility: Volatility of the stock’s returns, estimated using one year of returns.
B/M ratio: Book/Market Ratio. Listing age: Number of years on the stock exchange. Insider fraction: Fraction of the
company held by insiders. Largest owner: Fraction of the company owned by the ﬁrm’s largest owner. The analysis uses
monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 5: Determinants of holding period indicesPanel A: Stratiﬁed quartiles
hpi(ew) hpi(vw)
All 1 2 3 4 All 1 2 3 4
Annual Turnover 0.579 0.723 0.636 0.552 0.426 0.674 0.793 0.737 0.666 0.515
Annual Avg Rel BA Spread 0.576 0.515 0.550 0.573 0.690 0.671 0.642 0.649 0.672 0.735
Annual Amortized Spread 0.576 0.647 0.562 0.534 0.559 0.673 0.727 0.671 0.648 0.643
Panel B: Correlations between liquidity and holding periods
Correlation Rank Correlation
hpi(vw) hpi(ew) hpi(vw) hpi(ew)
Annual Turnover -0.509 -0.511 -0.478 -0.430
Annual Avg Rel BA Spread 0.207 0.380 0.185 0.268
Amortized Spread -0.079 -0.010 -0.118 -0.068
The table in Panel A splits the sample into four quartiles based on the two liquidity measures and shows how the holding
period indices vary. The table in Panel B shows Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients and Kendall’s rank correlation coeﬃcients
between holding period indices and liquidity measures. The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages of holding period
length at the stock level calculated over a period of one year by taking all owners observed at the ﬁnal date and taking
the average holding period over the period for these owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted average and the
index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the stock during one year divided by
number of shares outstanding. Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa   Pb)=Pt, averaged over a year. Amortized
Spread: The Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) deﬁnition of amortized spread, estimate of the annual cost of trading the stock.
The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 6: The link between holding period indices and liquidityPanel A: Turnover
Quartiles of
All Annual Turnover
1 2 3 4
Firm Size 301 136 222 515 334
Stock Volatility 3.5 4.3 3.5 3.1 3.3
BM Ratio 1.02 1.13 1.56 0.72 0.70
Firm listing age 7.3 7.5 7.1 7.2 7.3
Primary insider fraction 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.7
Largest owner 26.9 32.8 28.9 23.1 23.2
Panel B: Relative bid/ask spread
Quartiles of
All Annual Avg Rel BA Spread
1 2 3 4
Firm Size 873 1224 1030 695 537
Stock Volatility 3.5 2.4 2.9 4.0 5.9
BM Ratio 0.97 0.63 1.38 0.92 0.97
Firm listing age 7.9 9.1 7.9 6.9 7.9
Primary insider fraction 1.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.5
Largest owner 26.3 22.6 24.9 27.7 30.5
Panel C: Amortized spread
Quartiles of
All Annual Amortized Spread
1 2 3 4
Firm Size 308 892 234 84 27
Stock Volatility 3.5 2.7 3.1 3.8 5.3
BM Ratio 0.99 0.68 0.79 1.48 0.99
Firm listing age 7.3 9.7 7.7 6.0 5.8
Primary insider fraction 1.9 1.5 1.8 2.3 1.8
Largest owner 26.6 32.2 25.4 23.1 25.5
The tables show how the liquidity variables covary with ﬁrm characteristics. Each table shows averages of liquidity in
stratiﬁed samples. For each line we group the stocks in the sample in four quartiles by the criterion listed on the left.
We then calculate averages of turnover, bid/ask spread and amortized spread for each of the four groups. The quartiles
are sorted in increasing value. So for example in the ﬁrst line quartile 1 is the group with the smallest companies, and
quartile 4 contains the largest ﬁrms. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the stock during one year divided by number
of shares outstanding. Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa  Pb)=Pt, averaged over a year. Firm Size: The value
of the company’s equity. Stock Volatility: Volatility of the stock’s returns, estimated using one year of returns. B/M ratio:
Book/Market Ratio. Insider fraction: Fraction of the company held by insiders. Listing age: Number of years on the
stock exchange. Largest owner: Fraction of the company owned by the ﬁrm’s largest owner. The analysis uses monthly
data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 7: Determinants of liquidity measures - stratiﬁed quartilesAnnual Turnover Annual Avg Rel BA Spread Amortized Spread
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant -0.166 (0.51) 0.200 (0.00) 0.032 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) 0.052 (0.00) -0.009 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)
Stock Volatility -0.259 (0.72) 0.530 (0.00) 0.056 (0.00)
BM Ratio -0.115 (0.00) -0.001 (0.01) 0.000 (0.49)
ln(Firm listing age) 0.006 (0.69) 0.003 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Primary insider fraction 0.249 (0.23) 0.005 (0.42) 0.002 (0.20)
Largest owner -0.869 (0.00) 0.024 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00)
n 1639 1639 1639
R2 0.11 0.63 0.44
The table shows results of three independent regressions demonstrating how the liquidity variables listed at the top of
each column are determined by the explanatory variables listed in the rows. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the
stock during one year divided by number of shares outstanding. Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa   Pb)=Pt,
averaged over a year. Amortized Spread: The Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) deﬁnition of amortized spread, estimate of the
annual cost of trading the stock. Firm Size: The value of the company’s equity. Stock Volatility: Volatility of the stock’s
returns, estimated using one year of returns. B/M ratio: Book/Market Ratio. Insider fraction: Fraction of the company
held by insiders. Listing age: Number of years on the stock exchange. Largest owner: Fraction of the company owned by
the ﬁrm’s largest owner. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 8: Determinants of liquidity measures – regressionshpi(ew) hpi(vw) hpi(ew) hpi(vw) hpi(ew) hpi(vw)
Variable coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue coeﬀ pvalue
constant 0.722 (0.00) 0.512 (0.00) -0.127 (0.20) 0.058 (0.55) 0.998 (0.00) 0.752 (0.00)
ln(Firm Size) -0.013 (0.00) 0.008 (0.02) 0.021 (0.00) 0.024 (0.00) -0.033 (0.00) -0.008 (0.07)
Stock Volatility 0.688 (0.01) 0.502 (0.04) -2.765 (0.00) -1.423 (0.00) 0.882 (0.01) 0.678 (0.02)
BM Ratio 0.036 (0.00) 0.017 (0.00) 0.063 (0.00) 0.038 (0.00) 0.059 (0.00) 0.036 (0.00)
ln(Firm listing age) 0.097 (0.00) 0.034 (0.00) 0.079 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00) 0.099 (0.00) 0.035 (0.00)
Primary insider fraction -0.100 (0.08) 0.074 (0.17) -0.125 (0.04) 0.054 (0.35) -0.117 (0.08) 0.060 (0.32)
Largest owner -0.042 (0.13) 0.003 (0.90) -0.012 (0.69) 0.062 (0.03) 0.094 (0.00) 0.115 (0.00)
Annual Turnover -0.153 (0.00) -0.126 (0.00)
Annual Avg Rel BA Spread 4.774 (0.00) 2.620 (0.00)
Amortized Spread -6.784 (0.00) -5.976 (0.00)
n 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118
R2 0.50 0.32 0.46 0.18 0.31 0.12
The table shows results of four independent regressions showing how the holding period indices listed at the top of each
column are determined by the explanatory variables listed in the rows. The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages
of holding period length at the stock level calculated over a period of one year by taking all owners observed at the ﬁnal
date and taking the average holding period over the period for these owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted
average and the index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. Firm Size: The value of the company’s equity. Stock Volatility:
Volatility of the stock’s returns, estimated using one year of returns. B/M ratio: Book/Market Ratio. Insider fraction:
Fraction of the company held by insiders. Listing age: Number of years on the stock exchange. Largest owner: Fraction of
the company owned by the ﬁrm’s largest owner. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the stock during one year divided
by number of shares outstanding. Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa  Pb)=Pt, averaged over a year. Amortized
Spread: The Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) deﬁnition of amortized spread, estimate of the annual cost of trading the stock.
The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 9: Adding liquidity measures as determinants of holding period indicesPanel A: Excess returns
hpi(ew) hpi(vw) Turnover Spread Amortized Spread
1 1.31 1.21 2.13 0.86 1.13
2 1.30 1.88 1.34 1.20 1.07
3 1.25 1.05 1.36 1.80 1.53
4 1.48 0.89 1.42 1.45 0.94
5 1.36 0.96 1.73 1.44 1.40
6 0.82 1.29 1.98 1.30 1.45
7 0.75 1.09 1.57 1.61 1.36
8 1.30 1.18 1.55 1.35 1.89
9 1.16 0.65 1.24 2.69 2.41
10 0.70 1.18 1.57 2.16 2.67
Panel B: Returns in excess of the Fama French three factor model
hpi(ew) hpi(vw) Turnover Spread Amortized Spread
1 0.76 -0.37 0.64 0.01 -0.03
2 -0.75 1.31 -0.44 -0.14 -0.10
3 0.28 -0.42 0.04 -0.15 0.16
4 0.05 -0.37 0.21 -0.32 -0.35
5 0.23 0.06 0.30 -0.35 -0.07
6 -0.25 0.04 0.24 -0.55 -0.34
7 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.30 -0.42
8 0.40 0.17 -0.35 -0.24 -0.07
9 0.27 -0.38 -0.00 1.02 0.12
10 -0.11 0.44 -0.58 0.47 0.52
We here perform a number of cross-sectional investigations of asset prices. We show excess returns of 10 portfolios sorted
by either a holding period index (hpi) or a liquidity measure. For each stock we calculate the hpi indices and the three
liquidity measures annual turnover, average relative bid/ask spread and amortized spread. We then use these numbers to
group the stocks into 10 portfolios. This portfolio grouping is done at yearend. We then calculate returns of these portfolios
for the next year. The top table (panel A) describes the excess returns of these 10 portfolios, i.e. returns in excess of the
risk-free interest rate. The bottom table (panel B) describes the returns in excess of the Fama French three factor model
of these 10 portfolios. This is estimated as follows. For each stock we use ﬁve years of historical data to estimate the
parameters bm;bHML and bSMB in the Fama French model
rit   rft = bm;i(rmt   rft) + bHML;iHMLt + bSMB;iSMBt + "it
We then use the estimated parameters to ﬁnd the realized excess return the next month. Moving forward, parameters
are continuously reestimated using ﬁve years of data. The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages of holding period
length at the stock level calculated over a period of one year by taking all owners observed at the ﬁnal date and taking
the average holding period over the period for these owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted average and the
index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the stock during one year divided by
number of shares outstanding. Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa   Pb)=Pt, averaged over a year. Amortized
Spread: The Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) deﬁnition of amortized spread, estimate of the annual cost of trading the stock.
The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
Table 10: Cross-sectional investigations of asset pricesa rm spread
1 0.0066 (0.25) 0.8557 (0.00) 0.5261 (0.00)
2 0.0024 (0.62) 0.7867 (0.00) 0.1386 (0.04)
3 0.0013 (0.79) 0.9873 (0.00) 0.0168 (0.84)
4 0.0030 (0.63) 1.1870 (0.00) 0.1553 (0.12)
5 0.0002 (0.96) 0.9364 (0.00) -0.0731 (0.26)
6 0.0001 (0.98) 1.0675 (0.00) -0.0953 (0.20)
7 -0.0045 (0.43) 0.9692 (0.00) -0.5160 (0.00)
8 -0.0037 (0.59) 0.9145 (0.00) -0.4365 (0.00)
1(rm) 0.0152 0.00
2(spread) 0.0144 0.00
The table shows the result for estimating the system
E[r] = 
r = a + f
where the relative spread has been used to generate the “liquidity factor” (LIQ). Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread
(Pa   Pb)=Pt, averaged over a year. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1994:1
to 2007:12.
Table 11: GMM estimation of factor portfoliosspread turnover am spread hpi(ew) hpi(vw)
1 0.527 (0.00) -0.335 (0.07) 0.433 (0.00) 0.132 (0.02) 0.007 (0.90)
2 0.139 (0.04) -0.061 (0.58) 0.083 (0.25) -0.003 (0.95) 0.002 (0.86)
3 0.017 (0.84) 0.014 (0.91) -0.007 (0.93) -0.052 (0.19) 0.002 (0.84)
4 0.156 (0.12) -0.092 (0.55) 0.164 (0.05) 0.027 (0.49) 0.004 (0.88)
5 -0.073 (0.26) 0.056 (0.51) -0.074 (0.28) -0.061 (0.05) 0.001 (0.96)
6 -0.095 (0.20) 0.060 (0.58) -0.056 (0.41) -0.068 (0.11) 0.001 (0.95)
7 -0.516 (0.00) 0.331 (0.00) -0.400 (0.00) -0.189 (0.00) -0.003 (0.94)
8 -0.436 (0.00) 0.255 (0.10) -0.328 (0.00) -0.166 (0.02) -0.003 (0.95)
(m) 0.015 (0.00) 0.015 (0.00) 0.015 (0.00) 0.018 (0.00) 0.012 (0.70)
(spread) 0.014 (0.00)
(turnover) -0.025 (0.04)
(am spread) 0.031 (0.00)
(hpi(ew)) 0.044 (0.07)
(hpi(vw)) 2.026 (0.91)
The table summarizes ﬁve diﬀerent estimations of the system
E[r] = 
r = a + f
The system is estimated using GMM. We use two factors, a market factor, erm, which is the excess return on an equally
weighted market index, and a liquidity factor LIQ, constructed from portfolios sorted by various liquidity factors. We only
report the betas for the liquidity factor, not the alphas and betas against the market. The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw)
are averages of holding period length at the stock level calculated over a period of one year by taking all owners observed
at the ﬁnal date and taking the average holding period over the period for these owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally
weighted average and the index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. Turnover: Number of shares traded in the stock
during one year divided by number of shares outstanding. Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa Pb)=Pt, averaged
over a year. Amortized Spread: The Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) deﬁnition of amortized spread, estimate of the annual
cost of trading the stock. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1994:1 to 2007:12.
Table 12: GMM estimation of factor portfolios